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CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
MARYLAND'S "SON OF SAM" STATUTE DOES NOT
COMPEL A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO TURN OVER
NOTORIETY OF CRIMES CONTRACTS TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 638
A.2d 93 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime does pay. Criminals sell their stories to the media, which
serve up battery, rape, and murder to a hungry public. Victims relive
the horror of their ordeals in tabloids, newscasts, and talk shows
while their assailants profit in jail. In response, some states have
enacted statutes that permit earnings from the sale of a criminal's
story to be confiscated and to be made available to his victims.
In 1977, New York became the first state to enact such a statute.'
The statute was enacted in response to public outrage that serial
killer David Berkowitz, popularly known as the "Son of Sam," stood
to profit substantially by selling his account of five violent murders.
2
The statute was intended to furnish to the victims earnings from the
sale of Berkowitz's story.3 Statutes similar to the New York law,
1. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
"Son of Sam" Laws Regulating or Prohibiting Distribution of Crime-Related
Book, Film, or Comparable Revenues to Criminals, 60 A.L.R.4th 1210, 1213
(1988); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1995).
2. Lisa A. Morelli, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board: How the Characterization of a Speech Regulation Can
Effectively Destroy a Legitimate Law, 42 CATH. U.L. REv. 651, 652 n.5 (1993).
3. Id. New York's law provided, in pertinent part:
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
legal entity contracting with any person ... accused or convicted of
a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime,
by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phono-
graph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of
any kind, or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall
... pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by
terms of such contract, be owing to the person so accused or convicted
or his representatives.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1)(1982). The money given to the board was to be
held in escrow. Id. If the perpetrator was convicted, and if the victim obtained
a civil judgment for damages against the perpetrator, the judgment would be
paid out of the escrow account. Id. The statute was never enforced against
Berkowitz himself because he was declared incompetent to stand trial, and the
statute applied only to convicted persons at the time. Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 111 (1991).
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now commonly called "Son of Sam" laws, were subsequently enacted
in many states.4
The Maryland General Assembly enacted a "Son of Sam" law
in 1987.1 Maryland's law, article 27, section 764 of the Maryland
Annotated Code, was created to provide an opportunity for victims
to be compensated from the earnings of "notoriety of crimes con-
tracts." ' 6 Under section 764, "any person who enter[ed] a notoriety
of crimes contract with a defendant" was required to submit to the
Attorney General of Maryland a copy of the contract and all moneys
owed to the defendant under the contract. 7 The Attorney General
was given sole authority to determine whether a contract met the
statute's definition of a notoriety of crimes contract.8
The Attorney General was required to deposit any earnings from
a notoriety of crimes contract into an interest bearing escrow account
and was required to hold those earnings until a judgment of civil
damages could be obtained by the defendant's victims. 9 If a victim
was awarded civil damages against the defendant, the money was to
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020
(1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4201 to -4202 (1989 & Supp. 1994); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to -207
(1990 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-06 (1987 & Supp. 1994);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1835 to -1842 (1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01
- .06 (Baldwin 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-I to -14 (1988
& Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-401 to -411 (Supp. 1994). Congress
has also enacted a federal "Son of Sam" law entitled the Victims of Crime
Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82 (1994).
5. Fern Shen, Md. Sues to Block Ex-Teacher From Profiting From Sex Story,
WASH. POST, July 27, 1993, at BI.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(5)(1992 & Supp. 1995). As amended in 1992,
"notoriety of crimes contracts" included those contracts with respect to:
(i) The reenactment of a crime by way of a movie, book, magazine
article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television pres-
entation or live entertainment of any kind; (ii) The expression of the
defendant's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding a crime
involving or causing personal injury, death or property loss as a direct
result of the crime; or (iii) The payment or exchange of any money
or other consideration or the proceeds or profits that directly or
indirectly result from a crime, a sentence, or the notoriety of a crime
or sentence.
Id.
7. Id. § 764(b)(l)-(2).
8. Subsection (c)(2)(i) provides that "[a]fter the passage of 30 days, but before
the expiration of 180 days from receipt of the contract or moneys described
in subsection (b) (2) of this section, the Attorney General shall render a decision
as to whether a contract is a notoriety of crimes contract." Id. § 764(c)(2)(i)
(Supp. 1995).
9. Id. § 764(e)(l)(i)-(ii) (1992 & Supp. 1995).
be taken from the escrow account to satisfy the judgment. 0 If, after
five years, there were funds remaining in the account after all civil
judgments had been satisfied, the money in the escrow account was
to be returned to the defendant."
Attorney General J. Joseph Curran was the first to attempt to
enforce Maryland's "Son of Sam" law.' 2 Ronald Price, a former
high school teacher in Anne Arundel County, was indicted for, and
later convicted of, child sexual abuse and "unnatural and perverted
sex acts."' 3 Shortly after Price's indictment, the Washington Post
reported that he had "'signed an option to tell his story to a
Hollywood movie producer." '"1 4 Curran believed that this was a
notoriety of crimes contract. 5 He reasoned that there would be no
public interest in the life story of this Maryland high school teacher
were it not for his commission of crimes.' 6 Maryland's "Son of
Sam" law required that a copy of the notoriety of crimes contract
be submitted by the movie producer to the Attorney General's Office
for review.' 7 Because no copy had been submitted, an Assistant
Attorney General wrote to Price's attorney to request further infor-
mation about Price's contract.' Price's attorney admitted the exis-
tence of a contract but would not deliver or discuss it, arguing that
section 764 was unconstitutional. 9
10. Subsection (e)(2)(i) provides:
If, within 5 years of the establishment of the escrow account, the
victim brings or has a pending civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction or has recovered a money judgment for damages against
the defendant or has been awarded restitution, the Attorney General
shall pay . . . to the victim funds from the escrow account to the
extent of the money judgment or the amount of restitution.
Id. § 764(e)(2)(i).
11. Id. § 764(e)(4)(i).
12. Shen, supra note 5.
13. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 156 & n.1, 638 A.2d 93, 97 & n.1 (1994). Price
was charged with three counts of child sexual abuse and perverted sex practices
based on the sexual relationships Price had with three of his female students,
one of whom was fourteen years old. Shen, supra note 5, at B3. Price admitted
to these sexual relationships and to four others he had with students during
his twenty years at Northeast High School. Id. Price was convicted of both
charges and is currently serving a twenty-six year sentence. Price, 334 Md. at
156 n.l, 638 A.2d at 97 n.1.
14. Price, 334 Md. at 156 n.2, 638 A.2d at 97 n.2 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97.
16. Id.
17. See MD. ANN. CODIE art. 27, § 764(b)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1995).
18. Price, 334 Md. at 156-57, 638 A.2d at 97. The Assistant Attorney General
undoubtedly would have requested a copy of the contract from the party or
parties who had offered to buy Price's story, too, if the identity of such party
or parties were known.
19. Id. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97. A Washington Post article reported that Timothy
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The Attorney General sought an injunction in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County compelling Price to deliver the contract. 20
The circuit court found the statute to be "unconstitutional and
unenforceable ' 21 and, therefore, denied the injunction.2 2 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 23 performed a detailed constitu-
tional analysis of section 764.24 The court explained that section 764
was overbroad in several areas2 and outlined the required modifi-
cations. 26 The court did not, however, declare the statute unconsti-
tutional. 27 The court was able to avoid invalidating the statute because
it based its holding entirely upon the non-constitutional principles of
statutory construction .2
s
The court of appeals stated that the circuit court had erred by
declaring the "Son of Sam" statute unconstitutional because there
was a non-constitutional ground upon which the case could have
been decided. 29 Using the principles of statutory construction, the
court of appeals concluded that section 764 did not authorize the
Attorney General to compel Price to turn over a suspected notoriety
of crimes contract.30 As the court interpreted the statute, only parties
Umbreit, one of Price's attorneys, told Curran, via letter, that the state had
no right to attach Price's profits from its sale under the "Son of Sam" law
because the statute was unconstitutional. Shen, supra note 5, at I. In a letter
to Curran dated June 22, 1993, Umbreit wrote: "'The statute is presumptively
inconsistent with the First Amendment since it imposes financial burdens on
speakers because of the content of their speech."' Id.
20. Price, 334 Md. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97.
21. Id. "[Tlhe court determined that § 764 was unconstitutionally overinclusive on
its face and [that it, therefore,] violated the principles of the First Amendment."
Id.
22. Id.
23. Price appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Id. The court of
appeals granted certiorari prior to review by the court of special appeals
because of the important constitutional issues raised by the case. Id. at 157-
58, 638 A.2d at 97.
24. See id. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at 98-104.
25. Id. at 167-70, 638 A.2d at 102-03. If the constitutionality of the statute were
properly before the court, the statute would have been invalidated because the
court determined that it was a content-based regulation of speech that was not
narrowly tailored. Id. at 168-70, 638 A.2d at 103.
26. Id. The specific modifications recommended by the court are discussed infra
notes 169-201 and accompanying text.
27. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. "[W]e shall not reach the constitutionality of §
764 on its merits." Id.
28. Id. at 171-77, 638 A.2d at 104-07.
29. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. "We have long adhered to the policy of not
deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily .... If a decision on a constitutional
question is not necessary for proper disposition of the case, we will not reach
it." Id. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. The suit against Price was remanded to the circuit
court with instructions that the complaint be dismissed. Id.
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contracting with criminal defendants - not the defendants themselves
- could be compelled to turn over suspected notoriety of crimes
contracts. a"
The Price decision is troublesome because the Court of Appeals
of Maryland ignored one of the time-honored principles of judicial
restraint. It is every court's duty to avoid decisions on constitutional
grounds unless absolutely necessary to decide the case.32 If a case
can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds, a court is bound
to do so." Indeed, the court of appeals based its decision, in Curran
v. Price, on non-constitutional grounds simply by interpreting the
plain language of Maryland's "Son of Sam" law.1
4
Nevertheless, the court conducted a detailed constitutional anal-
ysis of the statute, even though the constitutional findings were not
necessary to the court's holding." This gratuitous and lengthy dis-
quisition was likely meant to inform the Maryland General Assembly
about the constitutional violations in the statute. By doing so, the
*court all but ensured that the "Son of Sam" law would withstand
judicial review the next time the statute came before a Maryland
court. The court stepped outside its role as interpreter of the law to
advocate a "Son of Sam" law for Maryland.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Principles
The court of appeals began its opinion with a review of relevant
constitutional principles developed by the Maryland and the federal
courts.36 The court explained that a government may restrict speech
through a statute either directly or indirectly.3 7 A statute that is
31. Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 106. This would most often be a member of the media,
e.g., book and magazine publishers or television and movie producers.
32. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at 98-104.
36. Price, 334 Md. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at 98-104.
37. See id. at 163-66, 638 A.2d at 100-01; LAURENCE H. TRME, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988). "First, government can aim at
ideas or information, in the sense of singling out actions for government
control or penalty either (a) because of the specific message or viewpoint such
actions express, or (b) because of the effects produced by awareness of the
information or ideas such actions impart." Id. (emphasis deleted). "Second,
without aiming at ideas or information in either of the above senses, government
can constrict the flow of information and ideas while pursuing other goals
...." Id. (emphasis deleted). "Speech" includes more than the "spoken or
written word." State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 50, 629 A.2d 753, 756 (1993).
The Supreme Court has held that "certain conduct may be 'sufficiently imbued
19961 Curran v. Price
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intended to silence a particular idea, message or viewpoint is a
content-based regulation of speech.3"
Content-based regulations of speech are presumptively unconsti-
tutional.3 9 "'[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial views.'''4° The pre-
sumption against constitutionality can be overcome, however, if the
statute meets the dual requirements of the strict scrutiny test'.4 The
strict scrutiny test requires that statutes be first: "necessary to serve
a compelling state interest, ' 42 and second: "narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." ' 43 Review under the extremely burdensome strict
scrutiny test" is warranted because content-based statutes present the
danger "that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace."
45
with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments."' Id. at 50-51, 629 A.2d at 756 (citation omitted).
For example, wearing black armbands and flag burning have been considered
"speech" when done to protest the Vietnam War and the Reagan Administra-
tion, respectively. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black armbands); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(flag burning).
38. See TRIE, supra note 37, at 794; Morelli, supra note 2, at 654.
39. Price, 334 Md. at 163, 638 A.2d at 100; TRIBE, supra note 37, at 790.
40. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (quoting Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
41. See, e.g., Morelli, supra note 2, at 654-55. Statutes must be necessary to
accomplish a compelling interest of the state and must be written narrowly
enough that they do not reach behavior unrelated to that compelling interest.
TRIBE, supra note 37, at 833.
42. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762 (1993) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); accord TRE, supra
note 37, at 833.
43. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
44. "[A] law rarely survives [strict] scrutiny . . " Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 199-200 (1992); Morelli, supra note 2, at 654-55.
45. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 114
(1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991)). One of the
rationales advanced for the decision to secure a right of free speech in the
United States Constitution is that the framers wanted to preserve a "market-
place of ideas."
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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To satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, a state must
prove that it has a compelling interest that justifies abridging the
First Amendment rights of its citizens and that the particular means
chosen to abridge those rights are necessary to serve the state's
interest. 46 A state's interest is compelling if it satisfies two criteria:
"First, the state must have a strong interest in realizing the statute's
underlying policies . . . . Second, the magnitude of the state interests
achieved must outweigh the restriction's chilling effect on speech." '47
If the state's interest is not compelling, the statute will be declared
void. 4 Similarly, if the means chosen to regulate the speech are not
necessary to advance the state's compelling interest, the statute will
be declared void. 49
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the
statute be drafted narrowly, that is, to restrict no more speech than
absolutely necessary. 0 This prong of the strict scrutiny test is also
known as an overbreadth provision.' A statute is considered narrowly
tailored, and not overbroad, if a court can discern no other scheme
that would deter less speech but still achieve the state's objective.52
"The doctrine of overbreadth is designed to protect First Amendment
freedom of expression from laws written so broadly that the fear of
punishment might discourage people from taking advantage of that
freedom." 53
46. See Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
47. Morelli, supra note 2, at 654 n.20 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 833 n.12 (2d ed. 1988)).
48. See TRIBE, supra note 37, at 798-99.
49. See Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762 (invalidating a Maryland cross
burning statute because it was not necessary to serve the state's interest -
protecting the community from fire hazards).
50. Id.; TRIBE, supra note 37, at 833. "The overbreadth doctrine has often been
understood as an exception to the rule that individuals generally may not
litigate the rights of third parties." Id. at 1023 (citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court recently described the doctrine, "an individual
whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited or
sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it
also threatens others not before the court - those who desire to
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing
so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared
partially invalid."
Id. (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)).
51. See Simon & Schuster, 105 U.S. at 121. An overly broad statute is one that,
while regulating unprotected speech in which the government has a compelling
interest, "'sweeps [protected speech, unrelated to the state's interest] within its
ambit . . . ."' TRIBE, supra note 37, at 1022 (citations omitted).
52. Morelli, supra note 2, at 654 n.20.
53. Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 36, 641 A.2d 870, 878 (1994). Laurence
Tribe makes an analogy to a Sword of Damocles to describe the chilling effect
of an overbroad statute. TRIBE, supra note 37, at 1023. "'[T]he value of a
19961
A statute that is not narrowly tailored will be declared void54
because it presents the danger that citizens will self-censor their
constitutionally-protected speech." Invalidation of a statute is a rem-
edy that is used sparingly, however.56 "[T]he mere fact that one can
conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not
sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. '5 7 A
statute will be invalidated as overbroad only if it regulates a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech.5"
In contrast to statutes that are intended to restrict speech directly,
the court of appeals explained, it is also possible for the government
to burden speech indirectly, through statutes aimed at producing
other results.5 9 Statutes that burden speech indirectly are called "con-
tent-neutral" regulations. 6° Such regulations are not aimed at the
content of the speech itself, but at some other aspect of the speech
- for example, the effects of the speech on the community. 6'
"Content-neutral" statutes can be "'justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.'
' 62
A governmental restriction of speech is not automatically per-
missible merely because it is content-neutral. 63 Content-neutral regu-
Sword of Damocles is that is hangs - not that it drops."' Id. Thus, the mere
existence of an overbroad statute, Tribe argues, deters speech. Id. "The only
solution, then, is to strike down such an overbroad law altogether until it is
rewritten or until an appropriate court authoritatively narrows it." Id.
54. See TRIBE, supra note 37, at 1022; Morelli, supra note 2, at 654. "If a
government regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of an act, the
regulation is unconstitutional unless the government can show that there is a
compelling state interest that outweighs the restriction on speech and that the
regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve this objective." Id. (citing LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 833 n.12 (2d ed. 1988)).
55. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 36, 641 A.2d at 878.
56. Id.
57. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800
(1984). "A plausible challenge to a law as void for overbreadth can be made
only when (1) the protected activity is a significant part of the law's target,
and (2) there exists no satisfactory way of severing the law's constitutional
from its unconstitutional applications so as to excise the latter clearly in a
single step from the law's reach." TRIE, supra note 37, at 1022 (emphasis
deleted).
58. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800-01; Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 36, 641
A.2d at 878; TRIBE, supra note 37, at 1024.
59. See Price, 334 Md. at 163-64, 638 A.2d at 100-01; Morelli, supra note 2, at
654 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at
790 (2d ed. 1988)).
60. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
61. The effect that speech has on the community is an example of a "secondary
effect" of speech. See id. at 47.
62. Id. at 48 (emphasis deleted)(citations omitted).
63. See id. at 47.
238 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 25
lations withstand judicial review more easily, however, because they
are reviewed under a less onerous standard than the strict scrutiny
test." A regulation that aims only at the "secondary effects" of
speech will be invalidated only if it "leaves too little breathing space
for communicative activity, or leaves people with too little access to
channels of communication, whether as would-be speakers or as
would-be listeners.' '65
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres," the Supreme Court upheld a
content-neutral regulation of speech. 67 The city of Renton enacted
an ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of a single or multiple-family dwelling, park, residential
zone, or church or within one mile of a school. 6 The restrictions
did not apply to all movie theaters, but only to adult movie theaters. 69
Two adult movie theater owners challenged the ordinance as a
content-based regulation of speech, arguing that their theaters had
been regulated solely upon the basis of the content of the films they
showed.
70
The Supreme Court explained that if the ordinance were truly
content-based, aimed at ridding the community of sexually explicit
films, it would have banned adult theaters altogether.7" Instead, the
legislature chose to restrict only the location of adult theaters. 72 The
Court, therefore, categorized the ordinance as a content-neutral "time,
place, and manner restriction. '73 The Court held that the ordinance
was designed to prevent crime and to protect property values, retail
64. See id. Such regulations are evaluated under the standard for time, place, and
manner restrictions. Id. Under this standard of review, a regulation will be
upheld if it is "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do[es]
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." Id. (citations
omitted).
65. TRME, supra note 37, at 978 (footnote omitted).
66. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
67. Id. at 54-55. "In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid
governmental response to the 'admittedly serious problems' created by adult
theaters . . .while also satisfying the dictates of the First Amendment." Id.
68. Id. at 44. The minimum distance required between an adult theater and a
school was later reduced to 1,000 feet. Id. at 45.
69. Id. at 44. "The term 'adult motion picture theater' was defined as '[a]n
enclosed building used for presenting . . .visual media, distinguished or char-
acterifzed] by an emphasis on . . . "specified sexual activities" or "specified
anatomical areas" ... for observation by patrons therein."' Id. (citation
omitted).
70. Id. at 45. The content upon which the ordinance was based was "specified
sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas." Id. at 44. The theaters
challenged the statute on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Id. at 45.
71. See id. at 46, 48.
72. Id.
73. Id.
1996] Curran v. Price
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trade, and the quality of life in Renton. 74 Thus, the ordinance targeted
the secondary effects of the theaters on the community, not the
content of adult films.75 The Court concluded by saying: "[T]he
Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of
'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech.'
' 76
The Court explained that regulations that target only the "sec-
ondary effects" of speech should be evaluated under the test for
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. 77 Such regula-
tions will be upheld if they are "designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative av-
enues of communication. 7 8 In Renton, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that both criteria were satisfied, and it upheld the ordinance.
79
The Court held that the city had a substantial interest 'in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life' in Renton.80 The Court also
held that reasonable alternative avenues of communication were
available because there were 520 accessible acres in the city of Renton
upon which adult theatres could operate. 8
In State v. Sheldon,8 2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Renton to a Maryland cross-
burning statute.83 The statute required that persons wishing to burn
a religious symbol, first, get permission from the owner of the
property on which the burning would occur and, second, notify the
fire department.8 4 In Sheldon, the state of Maryland argued that the
cross-burning statute was enacted to protect society from the "sec-
ondary effects" of burning religious symbols, namely fire hazards.
85
The state claimed that any resulting burden on speech was an
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 47. "The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect
the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and
the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular views."
Id.
76. Id. at 48 (emphasis deleted).
77. Id. at 49. "[Z]oning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary
effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to
'content-neutral' time, place, and manner regulations." Id.
78. Id. at 47.
79. Id. at 50-55.
80. Id. at 50 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
81. Id. at 53.
82. 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993).
83. Id. at 58-59, 61, 629 A.2d at 760-61.
84. Id. at 48-49, 629 A.2d at 755.
85. Id. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
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unintentional consequence . 6 The court of appeals disagreed and
invalidated the statute.
8 7
The court of appeals could find no way to justify the cross-
burning statute without reference to the content of the speech it
restricted.8 8 Maryland already had adequate laws to protect society
from fire hazards,8 9 so there would be no need for the cross-burning
statute unless it was regulating the "speech" associated with cross-
burning. Also, the legislative history clearly showed that the cross-
burning statute was enacted to prevent the expression of ideas the
legislature found unpalatable.9 The court held that the cross-burning
statute was a content-based regulation of speech. 9'
Once the cross-burning statute was categorized as a content-based
restriction of speech, the court was required to apply the strict scrutiny
test.y The statute failed the first prong of the test - that the statute
be necessary to serve a compelling state interest.93 Although the court
of appeals noted that "fire protection is certainly a compelling inter-
est,'' 94 the cross-burning statute was invalidated. 9 The court held that
the statute was not necessary to achieve the state's compelling interest9
because Maryland already had adequate fire protection measures. 97
86. See id.
87. Id. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
88. Id. at 56, 629 A.2d at 759.
First, the very definition of content-neutral indicates that the cross
burning statute is not. A content-neutral regulation . . . is one which
is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech"
.... We see no way to justify the cross burning statute without
referring to the substance of the speech it regulates, because the statute
does not protect property owners or the community from unwanted
fires any more than the law already protected those groups before the
statute's enactment.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
89. Id. The court explained that Maryland's arson and trespass laws, already in
effect, provided sufficient protection from fire hazards. Id.
90. Id. at 56-57, 629 A.2d at 759-60. "[T]he legislative history of the cross burning
statute reveals that the State's true purpose in enacting the statute was to
express disagreement with the act of burning religious symbols." Id. at 56,
629 A.2d at 759.
91. Id. at 55, 57, 629 A.2d at 759-60.
92. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 759-60. "We believe the cross burning statute is a
content-based regulation of speech, and therefore must be subject to strict
scrutiny." Id. at 55, 629 A.2d at 759.
93. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762. "Maryland's cross burning statute cannot survive
this [strict] scrutiny, because it is not necessary to serve the State's asserted
interest." Id.
94. Id. at 62 n.2, 629 A.2d at 762 n.2.
95. Id. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763. "[T]he cross burning statute must fall." Id.
96. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
97. Id. at 56, 629 A.2d at 759. The court explained that Maryland's arson and
trespass laws, already in effect, provided sufficient protection from fire hazards.
Id.
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When the court of appeals examined Maryland's "Son of Sam"
law, in Curran v. Price, it had not only the Renton and Sheldon
opinions to guide it, but also the Supreme Court's interpretation of
a similar "Son of Sam" law. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York Crime Victims Board,98 the Supreme Court invalidated New
York State's "Son of Sam" law, 99 declaring it an overly broad
content-based regulation of speech."00 The statute required any entity
contracting with a person "convicted"'' 10 of a crime to give a copy
of such contract and any moneys owed to the Crime Victims Board.1
0 2
The statute applied to all contracts that would provide compensation
to the convicted person for an account of his crime. 0 The moneys
given to the Board were to be placed into an escrow account and
were to be held for five years. 104 During that time, the victims of
the convicted person could attempt to obtain a judgment of civil
damages against him. 05 If the victim were successful, the judgment
would be paid out of the escrow account. 1°6 If no actions were
pending after five years, any moneys remaining in the escrow account
would be returned to the convicted person. 0 7
In Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court determined that New
York's "Son of Sam" law was content-based because it provided a
"financial disincentive to create or publish" certain works, based on
98. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
99. Id. at 123.
100. Id. "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial
burden that it places on no other speech and no other income. The State's
interest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime is a compelling one,
but the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to advance that objective. As
a result, the statute is inconsistent with the First Amendment." Id.
101. The New York law stated:
A person convicted of a crime shall include any person convicted of
a crime in this state either by entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction
after trial and any person who has voluntarily and intelligently ad-
mitted the commission of a crime for which such person is not
prosecuted.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (1982).
102. Id. § 632-a(1); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 106-09.
103. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109. The statute applied to all contracts with
respect to:
[Tihe reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine
article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television pres-
entation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of
such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or
emotions regarding such crime ....
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(l).
104. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109.
105. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109.
106. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109.
107. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(4); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109.
their subject matter. 08 The Court, therefore, applied the strict scru-
tiny test.'09 The High Court found that "ensuring that victims of
crime are compensated by those who harm them" and "that criminals
do not profit from their crimes," were compelling state interests. 10
Nevertheless, the Court felt that the statute was not sufficiently
tailored to serve those interests because it burdened many works
unrelated to those interests."' The statute was, therefore, declared
overbroad. 1"
2
The Court attributed the statute's unconstitutional overbreadth
both to the broad definition of "convicted person" and to the
unlimited range of subjects covered by the statute."3 Under the
statute's broad definition of "convicted person," the statute applied
to any works wherein the author admitted that he had committed a
crime, regardless of whether he was ever accused, charged, or con-
victed." 4 The statute also applied to "works on any subject, provided
that they express[ed] the author's thoughts or recollections about his
crime, however tangentially or incidentally.""' 5
Maryland's "Son of Sam" law was modeled after the New York
law that was later invalidated in Simon & Schuster."6 Maryland's
law was amended by the legislature in an attempt to remedy the
108. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117. The Supreme Court would not address
the State of New York's argument that the "Son of Sam" statute was content-
neutral. Id. The Court found it unnecessary to address the argument because,
looking ahead to the elements of the strict scrutiny test, it was clear that the
statute would fail on overbreadth grounds. Id. at 121 n.l.
109. Id. at 117.
110. Id. at 117, 119.
111. Id. at 121-23. The Court noted that the statute "clearly reach[ed] a wide range
of literature that d[id] not enable a criminal to profit while a victim remain[ed]
uncompensated." Id. at 121.
112. Id. at 123. "[T]he Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored." Id.
113. Id. at 121. "These two provisions combine to encompass a potentially very
large number of works." Id.
114. Id. To demonstrate the overbreadth of the New York law, the court explained
that the statute, if it had been in effect at the time, would have covered many
historic works - all unrelated to New York's goals. Id.
Had the Son of Sam law been in effect at the time and place of
publication, it would have escrowed payment for such works as The
Autobiography of Malcolm X, which describes crimes committed by
the civil rights leader before he became a public figure; Civil Diso-
bedience, in which Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes and
recalls his experience in jail; and even the Confessions of Saint
Augustine, in which the author laments "my past foulness and the
carnal corruptions of my soul," one instance of which involved the
theft of pears from a neighboring vineyard.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 159, 638 A.2d 93, 98 (1994).
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defects that the Supreme Court had identified in the New York law."1 7
For example, the definition of notoriety of crimes contracts was
expanded to include contracts "with respect to 'the payment or
exchange of any money or other consideration or the proceeds or
profits that directly or indirectly result from a crime . . . .",, This
expansion was an attempt to make the statute content-neutral by
placing the focus on the profit derived from the contract rather than
on the subject matter of the material." 9
Maryland's General Assembly also attempted to eliminate the
overly broad areas that the Supreme Court had identified in the New
York law. 20 One of the problems with the New York law was its
broad definition of "convicted person."' 2' The General Assembly,
therefore, narrowed the definition of "defendant," Maryland's coun-
terpart to New York's "convicted person," to a person charged with
or convicted of a crime. 22 Another problem with the New York law
was that it could be applied to works only tangentially or incidentally
related to a crime. 2 1 Subsections (c)(2)-(3) were added to the Mary-
117. Id. at 159-60, 638 A.2d at 98.
118. Id. at 161, 638 A.2d at 99.
119. Id.
It was the purpose of the Maryland legislature, in amending § 764,
to make its provisions content-neutral and remedy the problem of
overbreadth. To this end, the amendments to § 764 ... added
language to the original subsection (b) which broadened the description
of applicable contracts to include not only those with respect to
reenactment of a crime or the expression of the defendant's thoughts,
feelings, opinions or emotions regarding the crime, but also those
with respect to "the payment or exchange of any money or other
consideration or the proceeds or profits that directly or indirectly
result from a crime, a sentence, or the notoriety of a crime or
sentence."
Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(5)(iii) (emphasis added)).
120. Id. at 165, 638 A.2d at 101. "It was the purpose of the Maryland legislature,
in amending § 764, to . . . remedy the problem of overbreadth." Id. at 161,
638 A.2d at 99.
121. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.
122. Price, 334 Md. at 161, 638 A.2d at 99. The definition of defendant was
narrowed by eliminating subsection (a)(2)(ii), which provided that: 'Defendant'
includes a person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted to the com-
mission of a crime for which the person is not prosecuted." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 764(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1995). This definition was broad enough to sweep
in defendants who the Supreme Court had held should not be penalized. See
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121. The current definition of "defendant"
includes only persons "charged with or convicted of a crime in [Maryland]
involving or causing personal injury, death, or property loss as a direct result
of the crime, and includes a person found not criminally responsible for
criminal conduct under § 12-108 of the Health-General Article." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(2)(i).
123. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.
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land law as a remedy.' 24 Subsection (c)(2) provided for the review by
the Attorney General of suspected notoriety of crimes contracts.
25
The statute required that the Attorney General determine within
thirty days whether a contract was, in fact, a notoriety of crimes
contract. 2 6 Subsection (c)(3) provided an exemption for works that
were only tangentially related to the defendant's crime.
27
B. Principles of Statutory Construction
The Court of Appeals of Maryland is bound by common law
precedent to base its holding on non-constitutional grounds whenever
possible. 28 In Price, the court was able to base its holding on the
non-constitutional principles of statutory construction. 29 "The car-
dinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the
real legislative intent."' 30 To do this, courts look to the language of
the statute, construed in its ordinary usage. 3' Courts must harmonize
or reconcile all words so that no part of the statute is "rendered
nugatory or superfluous."'3 2 If there is no ambiguity in the wording
124. Price, 334 Md. at 161, 165, 638 A.2d at 99, 101.
125. Id. at 165-66, 638 A.2d at 101. Subsection (c)(2) provides that "[a]fter the
passage of 30 days, but before the expiration of 180 days from receipt of the
contract ... the Attorney General shall render a decision as to whether a
contract is a notoriety of crimes contract." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
764(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1995).
126. Price, 334 Md. at 165-66, 638 A.2d at 101. The Attorney General could keep
the contract under review for up to 180 days "for cause." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 764(c)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
127. Price, 334 Md. at 166, 638 A.2d at 101. Subsection (c)(3) provides that
For the purposes of rendering a decision under this subsection, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the contract is a notoriety of
crimes contract. The defendant may rebut this presumption by estab-
lishing to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the subject
matter of the contract only tangentially or incidentally relates to the
crime.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(3) (Supp. 1995).
128. Price, 334 Md. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104. The requirement that a court avoid
constitutional questions when there is another ground upon which the case can
be decided is part of a court's self-imposed justiciability requirements. TamE,
supra note 37, at 69.
129. Price, 334 Md. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. "[W]e shall not reach the constitu-
tionality of § 764 on its merits. Instead, we decide only that the statute does
not require a defendant to submit to the Attorney General a suspected notoriety
of crimes contract .... ." Id.
130. Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1977);
see also Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 757 (1993).
131. Condon, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 758; Dowling, 281 Md. at 418, 379
A.2d at 1010.
132. Condon, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 758; see also Dowling, 281 Md. at 419,
379 A.2d at 1011.
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of a statute, it alone represents the intent of the legislature, and the
courts need not look further.'33
Sometimes, however, the plain language of the statute is ambig-
uous, and courts must look elsewhere to determine legislative intent.
3 4
Courts may consider the consequences of alternate meanings of a
word and may adopt the meaning most consistent with common
sense, prevailing law, or public policy.'35 Courts can also examine a
statute's legislative history. 3 6 Legislative intent can be construed from
drafts of the bill before its enactment, transcripts of debates about
the bill on the legislative floor, and amendments to a statute after
its enactment.' 37
III. THE INSTANT CASE
Attorney General J. Joseph Curran attempted to enforce Mar-
yland's "Son of Sam" law for the first time in the Spring of 1993
- six years after the statute's enactment. 38 When Curran demanded
a copy of a suspected notoriety of crimes contract from criminal
defendant Ronald Price, however, Price's attorney refused, arguing
that section 764 was unconstitutional. 39 Curran sought injunctive
relief in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 4' Price stated
that the "Son of Sam" law was unconstitutional, but put forth no
legal argument to support that belief.' 4' The American Civil Liberties
Union, appearing as amicus curiae, argued that Maryland's "Son of
Sam" statute burdened a substantial amount of speech that was
unrelated to the state's compelling interests and, therefore, that the
statute was an unconstitutional, overly broad, content-based regula-
tion of speech.
42
The Attorney General of Maryland argued that the "Son of
Sam" law was a content-neutral regulation that indirectly burdened
133. See Dowling, 281 Md. at 418, 379 A.2d at 1010-1011; Condon, 332 Md. at
491, 632 A.2d at 758.
134. Condon, 332 Md. at 492, 632 A.2d at 758.
135. Id. at 491-92, 632 A.2d at 758.
136. Id. at 492, 632 A.2d at 758.
137. E.g., State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 56-57, 629 A.2d 753, 759-60 (1993).
138. See Shen, supra note 5.
139. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 156-57, 638 A.2d 93, 97 (1994).
140. Id. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97.
141. Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 98.
142. Id. In support of this argument, the court explained that some contracts would
eventually be found to be exempt from § 764 because they would not fit the
definition of notoriety of crimes contracts. Id. at 166, 638 A.2d at 102. Such
contracts would not be related to the state's compelling interests. Id. Never-
theless, the parties to the contracts would have been unconstitutionally burdened
during the Attorney General's review. Id.
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speech. 43 The goal of the statute, Curran argued, was not to prevent
a criminal from telling his story merely because the legislature does
not like such stories; this would be a content-based statute, aimed
at silencing the speech itself.'44 The statute's real goal, the Attorney
General argued, was to prevent a "secondary effect" of the speech
- that a criminal could profit from his own crime while his victims
remained uncompensated. 1 5 Any burden the statute would place on
the speech itself, the Attorney General argued, was purely inciden-
tal. '46
The trial court denied the Attorney General's request for in-
junctive relief and declared section 764 unconstitutional because it
was an overly broad, content-based regulation of speech. 47 The
Attorney General appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. 48 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari
prior to review by the court of special appeals. 49 The court of
appeals vacated the decision of the circuit court because a decision
on the constitutional question was deemed unnecessary. 50 The court
of appeals, instead, used the principles of statutory construction to
arrive at its holding - that the "Son of Sam" law did not compel
a criminal defendant to provide a copy of a suspected notoriety of
crimes contract to the Attorney General, although it clearly did
require the other contracting party to do so."'
The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and
to give effect to the intent of the legislature. 52 However, the intent
of the General Assembly in enacting the "Son of Sam" law was not
immediately apparent to the court of appeals because the statute
contained ambiguous language.'53 Subsection (d) of section 764 pro-
hibited a "person" from concealing the existence of a notoriety of
143. Id. at 158, 638 A.2d at 98. Notwithstanding the constitutional arguments made
in his petition, Attorney General Curran urged the court of appeals not to
address the constitutionality of the "Son of Sam" law at oral arguments. Id.
Because all Curran requested was an injunction so that he could review Price's
contract, Curran felt that the constitutional issues were not before the court
and that the court should wait for a full review of the factual record before
determining the constitutionality of § 764. Id.
144. Id. at 162, 638 A.2d at 100. The state's goal was to prevent criminals from
profiting from their crimes, not from speaking about them. Id.
145. Id. at 162-63, 638 A.2d at 99-100.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 157-58, 638 A.2d at 97.
150. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107.
151. Id.
152. Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 757 (1993); Police Comm'r
v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1977).
153. Price, 334 Md. at 173, 638 A.2d at 105.
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crimes contract or from making or receiving payments under such a
contract.'5 4 Ronald Price was a "person," as defined in the statute,
and the Attorney General argued that Price was concealing a contract
in violation of subsection (d).' 55 In contrast, subsection (b) provided
that any "person who enter[ed] into a notoriety of crimes contract
with a defendant" had to submit a copy of the contract and any
money owed to the defendant under the contract to the Attorney
General. 56 The court recognized that the two provisions were in
conflict: subsection (d) applied to criminal defendants but subsection
(b) did not.1
7
Maryland's principles of statutory construction require that all
parts of a statute be read together and reconciled if possible., 8 The
court was able to reconcile the conflicting provisions by concluding
that the General Assembly intended a distinction between "person"
and "defendant" and that no criminal defendant could be considered
a "person" for the purposes of subsection (d). 15 9 To support this
decision, the court noted that the legislature provided separate defi-
nitions for "person" and "defendant" in the statute itself. 160 The
court held that the Attorney General was not authorized to institute
the suit seeking an injunction against Price because, as written,
neither subsection (b) nor subsection (d) applied to the criminal
defendant. 16 Instead, subsections (b) and (d) applied only to those
persons who contracted with the criminal defendant. 6
2
The court found this interpretation to be in accord with public
policy. 63 The court explained that a defendant's production of a
notoriety of crimes contract would implicitly acknowledge the com-
mission of a crime.'6 To require such an acknowledgment, before
154. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(d)(1)-(2) (1992); Price, 334 Md. at 171, 638
A.2d at 104.
155. Price, 334 Md. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104.
156. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added); Price,
334 Md. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104.
157. See Price, 334 Md. at 172-74, 638 A.2d at 104-06.
158. See id. at 173, 638 A.2d at 105.
159. Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 105-06. "[Tlhe language [of the statute] suggests a
distinction between a 'person' and a 'defendant' . . . ." Id.
160. Id. "That the distinction between a 'person' and a 'defendant' was intended
by the General Assembly is clear from the separate definitions given those
terms in the definitions section of the statute." Id.
161. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 106. "Considering the consequences of each interpre-
tation, the construction limiting subsection (d) to nondefendants is an inter-
pretation that is more reasonable and more consistent with public policy." Id.
164. Id. at 176, 638 A.2d at 107. Section 764 is not part of a state regulatory
scheme "unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws," id. (quoting
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 550 (1990)),
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trial, would be "inconsistent with public policy protecting the rights
of the accused" and would raise "serious questions concerning the
defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 65 By
explaining that such a provision would violate a defendant's right
against compelled self-incrimination, the court most likely sought to
prevent the General Assembly from rewriting the statute and applying
subsection (b) to criminal defendants.' 66
Before the court engaged in the statutory interpretation leading
to its holding, it gave a detailed analysis of the constitutional infir-
mities of Maryland's "Son of Sam" statute. 167 The court of appeals
relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Simon &
Schuster to decide Curran v. Price.68 The original language of
Maryland's "Son of Sam" law, enacted in 1987, was substantially
the same language as that invalidated in Simon & Schuster.'69 Section
764 was amended in 1992 to cure some of the constitutional defects
identified by the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster.
70
In an attempt to make the statute content-neutral, the General
Assembly expanded the definition of notoriety of crimes contracts to
include contracts "with respect to . . . 'the payment or exchange of
any money or other consideration or the proceeds or profits that
directly or indirectly result from a crime . . . . "",71 This expansion
was intended to place the focus of the law on the profits to the
criminal defendant, instead of on the content of his speech. 72 In
Curran v. Price, the court of appeals held that the statute was still
content-based because the language that mirrored the content-based
language in the New York statute was never amended."'
rather it concerns an area "permeated with criminal statutes." Id. (quoting
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 45 (1968)).
165. Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 106.
166. See id. at 174-76, 638 A.2d at 106-07.
167. Id. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at 98-104.
168. Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 98. "In reviewing the constitutionality of Maryland's
statute, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster
v. New York Crime Victims Board.. . ." Id. (citation omitted).
169. Id. "Maryland's statute was based originally upon the New York statute ...
Id.
170. Id. at 159-60, 638 A.2d at 98. "The original Maryland statute was subsequently
amended to its current form in 1992 in response to [the Simon & Schuster]
decision." Id.
171. Id. at 161, 638 A.2d at 99.
172. See id. at 162, 638 A.2d at 99. The Attorney General argued that the statute's
"true purpose [was] not to prevent criminals from communicating about their
crimes, but to prevent them from making financial profit from their crimes
while their victims [went] uncompensated." Id.
173. Id. at 161, 166, 638 A.2d at 99, 102. The court noted that subsection (c)(3)
provided limiting language, but also noted that the language of subsections
(a)(5)(i) and (ii) was still "virtually identical to the language invalidated by the
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The court of appeals noted that the review required under
subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) of section 764 provided further proof
that the "Son of Sam" law was content-based. 17 4 Maryland's General
Assembly had added subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) to Maryland's "Son
of Sam" law in response to Simon & Schuster. 75 The Supreme Court
held that New York's "Son of Sam" law was "significantly over-
inclusive" because it swept too broadly and covered works only
tangentially or incidentally related to the defendant's crime.'7 6 Sub-
section (c)(2), providing for the review of suspected notoriety of
crimes contracts by the Attorney General to determine whether they
were covered by section 764,177 and subsection (c)(3), providing an
exemption for works that were only tangentially related to the de-
fendant's crime, 71 fixed the overbreadth problem identified in the
New York law. 79 Nevertheless, these subsections created a new
constitutional problem. The new subsections of Maryland's "Son of
Sam" statute placed great emphasis on the content of the account
of the crime that would be sold under the contract. 80 Thus, the
court of appeals did not find the "Son of Sam" law to be content-
neutral, as the Attorney General had advocated. Rather, the statute
was held to be content-based,' 8' which meant that it would have had
to withstand strict scrutiny in order to have been upheld.
Supreme Court in [Simon & Schuster]." Id. at 166, 638 A.2d at 102. "As we
see it, while the language of § 764(a)(5)(iii) does not expressly target speech,
its addition does not appear to negate the content-based nature of the language
in subsections (a)(5)(i) and (ii)." Id. at 161, 638 A.2d at 99.
174. See id. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103.
175. Id. at 159-61, 638 A.2d at 98-99.
176. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121
(1991).
177. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1995); Price, 334 Md. at
169, 638 A.2d at 103.
178. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(3) (Supp. 1995); Price, 334 Md. at 169, 638
A.2d at 103.
179. Price, 334 Md. at 166, 638 A.2d at 102. "[T]he limiting language of (c)(3)
would provide a means of escape for the famous works of literature which the
Court noted would be swept into the definition's overbroad grasp ...... Id.
180. Id. at 161, 638 A.2d at 99.
As we see it, while the language of § 764 (a)(5)(iii) does not expressly
target speech, its addition does not appear to negate the content-based
nature of the language in subsections (a)(5)(i) and (ii). These subsec-
tions still define a notoriety of crimes contract by the content of the
work to which it relates, specifically "the reenactment of a crime" or
"the expression of the defendant's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or
emotions regarding a crime."
Id.
181. Id. at 162-63, 638 A.2d at 100. "[T]he statute's language, specifically that in
subsections (a)(5)(i) and (ii), appears to be content-based in that it requires the
Attorney General to analyze the content of the work in order to determine its
applicability to the statute." Id.
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If the constitutionality of the "Son of Sam" statute had been
before the court in Price, the statute would have failed the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test. 18 2 Maryland's high court explained
that by allowing an exemption for tangentially related works the
General Assembly cured the overbreadth problem that was identified
in Simon & Schuster, but, at the same time, the General Assembly
created a different overbreadth problem.8 3 If the account of the
defendant's crime were found by the Attorney General to have been
unrelated to the state's compelling interest because it was only
tangentially related to the defendant's crime, and therefore exempt
from section 764, the defendant would still have been deprived of
his earnings during the Attorney General's review. 184 Such a depri-
vation would have been a violation of the defendant's First Amend-
ment right of free speech because: "It is . . . beyond question that
to deny compensation for certain speech will chill such speech.' 85
The court of appeals explained that the financial burden upon
the tangentially related works could have been tolerated if there had
been sufficient procedural safeguards built into the statute "to avoid
unduly suppressing protected speech."' 1 In Freedman v. Maryland,
8 7
the Supreme Court listed the procedural safeguards that would be
required if future prior restraints on speech were to be upheld. 8 In
Curran v. Price, however, the court of appeals concluded that the
"statutory scheme [of section 764] impose[d] a heavy burden upon
protected expression" and that the review process arguably "pro-
vide[d] insufficient procedural safeguards to withstand constitutional
scrutiny." 189
First, under Maryland's "Son of Sam" law any criminal's con-
tract to sell a story about himself was presumed to be a notoriety
182. Id. at 166-70, 638 A.2d at 102-03.
183. See id. at 166, 638 A.2d at 102.
184. Id. "[The limiting language of (c)(3) would provide a means of escape for
the famous works of literature which the Court noted would be swept into the
definition's overbroad grasp .... ." Id.
185. Id. at 162, 638 A.2d at 99.
186. Id. at 167, 638 A.2d at 102. The Supreme Court set forth guidelines for
creating valid prior restraints on speech in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965).
187. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
188. For a discussion of the safeguards required by the Freedman court see infra
notes 190-201 and accompanying text. "Although the first amendment is not
an absolute bar to prior restraints, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that
any 'system of prior restraints comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."' TRIBE, supra note 37, at 1041 (quoting
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
189. Price, 334 Md. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103. "Section 764's process of review
would appear to conflict with the standards set forth in Freedman in several
respects." Id. at 169, 638 A.2d at 103.
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of crimes contract. 90 In order for a defendant to have his funds
returned to him, the defendant had the burden of proving that the
subject of the work was only tangentially related to his crime.' 9' In
Freedman, the Supreme Court held that a valid prior restraint on
speech would have to have a statutory presumption in favor of the
defendant. 92 In other words, the State of Maryland, not the defen-
dant, would have to bear the burden of proving that the contract
being reviewed was a notoriety of crimes contract. 93 Therefore, in
order to withstand the rigors of the strict scrutiny test in the future,
section 764 will have to be re-written so that the statutory presump-
tion favors the defendant. 94
Second, under Maryland's "Son of Sam" law the Attorney
General's decision as to whether a contract was a notoriety of crimes
contract was final unless the defendant or the party contracting with
him sought judicial review. 95 In Freedman, the Supreme Court
determined that only a procedure that would require a judicial
determination would constitute a valid restraint.' 96 To withstand strict
scrutiny by the court of appeals in the future, therefore, the General
Assembly will have to re-write section 764 to provide for automatic
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision.
97
Finally, under Maryland's "Son of Sam" law the Attorney
General was allowed to review a suspected notoriety of crimes con-
tract for up to six months prior to any judicial review. 98 In addition,
the Attorney General could extend that review period for an unlimited
time "for cause."' 99 In Freedman, the Supreme Court held that a
190. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(3) (Supp. 1995).
191. Id. This subsection provides:
For the purposes of rendering a decision under this subsection, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the contract is a notoriety of
crimes contract. The defendant may rebut this presumption by estab-
lishing to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the subject
matter of the contract only tangentially or incidentally relates to the
crime.
Id.
192. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58; Price, 334 Md. at 168, 638 A.2d at 103.
193. See Price, 334 Md. at 168, 638 A.2d at 103.
194. See id. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103.
195. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(6) (Supp. 1995). This subsection provides:
The decision of the Attorney General rendered under this subsection
is a final decision and may be appealed by a defendant or a victim
only in accordance with subsection (n) of this section within 60 days
after the appellant received notice of the decision.
Id.
196. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
197. See Price, 334 Md. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103.
198. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1995).
199. Id. § 764(c)(2)(ii).
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valid restraint on speech would have to assure that the final judicial
review would be prompt. 200 Although the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land did not specify the exact amount of time that should be given




A. Impact of Statutory Interpretation
Subsection (b) of section 764 was interpreted by the court of
appeals to be inapplicable to criminal defendants. 2 2 This interpretation
by the court of appeals will have a significant -impact on the future
usefulness of Maryland's "Son of Sam" law. If criminal defendants
cannot be compelled to deliver copies of suspected notoriety of crimes
contracts to the state, the "Son of Sam" law will be more difficult to
enforce. 2°3 To extract a copy of a contract from a criminal defendant
would be relatively easy, without the prohibitions imposed by the court
of appeals, because the Attorney General would know where the
defendant would be and could bring him into court at any time to
compel production. But the Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided
that compelling a criminal defendant to produce a notoriety of crimes
contract violates his constitutional protection against self-incrimina-
tion.2 Therefore, the state may only force the party contracting with
the defendant to produce the contract. 2°5
A party who contracts with a defendant is legally bound by
section 764206 and can be forced by court order to comply with its
200. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
201. See Price, 334 Md. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103.
While the Court in Freedman considered a period of six months until
final appellate review to constitute an impermissible delay, subsection
(c)(2)(i) provides for up to six months for administrative review by
the Attorney General prior to any judicial review. Subsection (c)(2)(ii)
provides for an unlimited extension of that period for cause.
Id. at 169, 638 A.2d at 103.
202. Id. at 172-73, 638 A.2d at 105. "Nothing in [subsection (b)] requires defendants
to submit [notoriety of crimes] contracts to the Attorney General .... We
conclude . . . that subsection (b) does not countenance obtaining the contract
from Price." Id.
203. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107.
204. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
205. Price, 334 Md. at 174, 638 A.2d at 106. "Subsection (b) applies exclusively to
persons contracting with a defendant, and not to defendants." Id. at 173, 638
A.2d at 105. "[T]he legislature intended subsection (d) not to apply to defen-
dants, but only to persons contracting with defendants." Id. at 174, 638 A.2d
at 106.
206. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. "[T]he other party to the contract [made with a
defendant] is required by the statute to produce it [sic] and . . . is subject to
a severe penalty for failure to do so." Id.
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provisions. Forcing such compliance, however, is not as simple as it
sounds. For example, in Price the Attorney General considered it
necessary to request a copy of the contract from the defendant
because the Attorney General did not know the identity of the other
party to the contract. 2 7 Eventually, of course, the account of the
crime would be released to the public, and the Attorney General
would discover the identity of the other party. The longer that the
state is prevented from confiscating the earnings from the contract,
however, the greater the risk that those earnings will be dissipated
before the victim has had a chance to obtain a civil judgment. 20 8 The
court of appeals recognized that its decision would make the enforce-
ment of section 764 more difficult, but the court apparently thought
that the penalties for violating the statute would encourage compli-
ance by persons who contract with defendants. 2 °
B. Impact of Constitutional Interpretation
Many states have enacted "Son of Sam" statutes. 210 Variation
from the New York law occur mostly in the statutes of limitation,
the priorities of allocation, and the distribution of any remaining
money.21' Florida and New Jersey are among the four states that
have been called upon to decide the constitutionality of their "'Son
of Sam" laws.2 12 The opinions of the Florida and New Jersey courts
illustrate an alternative position that the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land could have adopted when deciding Curran v. Price.
Florida's "Son of Sam" law is similar to the New York law in
its essential elements. 213 It establishes a lien in favor of the state
207. See id. at 156-57, 638 A.2d at 97. "[Ain assistant Attorney General wrote to
Price's counsel inquiring whether Price had, in fact, entered into a contract
that might be covered by [section 7641, and, if so, with whom and for what
consideration." Id. (emphasis added).
208. As long as a defendant has unfettered access to his money he can, for example,
spend it, gift it, hide it or gamble it away, either directly or through an
intermediary who is not incarcerated.
209. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107.
210. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020
(1990); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4201 to -4202 (1989 & Supp. 1994); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4.1-201
to -207 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-06 (1987
& Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1835 to -1842 (1994); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Baldwin 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-
1 to -14 (1988 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-401 to -411 (Supp.
1994).
211. See Sarno, supra note 1, at 1214-16.
212. Thus far, only New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Maryland have reported
opinions discussing the constitutionality of their "Son of Sam" laws.
213. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
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upon proceeds owed to a convicted felon, or anyone on his behalf,
from "any literary, cinematic, or other account of the crime for
which [the felon] was convicted. 21 4 The primary difference between
the New York and Florida laws is the priority of distribution given
to funds attached by the state. 215 Florida's law requires that one-
quarter of the proceeds earned by the defendant be immediately
distributed to his dependents. 2 6 If the defendant has no dependents,
this portion of the proceeds goes to the Crimes Compensation Trust
Fund to be distributed to other victims of crime in Florida. 2 7 Second
in priority for distribution are the victims of the felon or their
dependents. 218 The victims or their dependents also receive one-quarter
of the proceeds. 21 9 If there are no victims, this quarter of the proceeds
is given to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund; if the victims'
damages are less than one-quarter of the proceeds, the remainder
goes to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund. 220 The defendant's
legal fees, given top priority for distribution under the New York
law, are third in line for distribution under the Florida law. 221
The constitutionality of the Florida law was challenged, in an
intermediate appellate court, in Rolling v. State. 222 The trial court
had temporarily enjoined the disbursement to the defendant of the
proceeds "obtained from any recounting of a crime. ' ' 2 3 On appeal,
the defendant claimed that the "Son of Sam" law was "an improper
prior restraint upon constitutionally protected speech. ' 224 The court
declined to reach the defendant's constitutional challenge, however,
because there were other grounds upon which to dispose of the
case. 225
The Florida court decided the case using the principles of stat-
utory construction. 226 The express language of the statute did not
provide for a temporary injunction prior to a defendant's convic-
tion. 227 In fact, the statute clearly stated that the state's right to a
214. Id. § 944.512(1).
215. Id. § 944.512(2)(a)-(d).
,216. Id. § 944.512(2)(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 944.512(2)(b).
219. Id.
220. Id. Subsection (2)(c) provides that all court costs in prosecution of the convicted
felon should be paid before the residue is placed into the Crimes Compensation
Trust Fund. Id. § 944.512(2)(c).
221. Id.




226. Id. at 637.
227. Id.
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lien was contingent upon the defendant's conviction for the alleged
crime. 2  The appellate court vacated the lower court's decision with-
out addressing the issue of whether a more narrowly drafted injunc-
tion would have passed constitutional muster. 229 The Florida law has
not yet undergone another constitutional challenge.
New Jersey's "Son of Sam" law is also similar to New York's
"Son of Sam" law. 230 The New Jersey law requires anyone contract-
ing with a defendant for an account of his crime to give a copy of
the contract and all moneys owed to the defendant to the Violent
Crimes Compensation Board. 231 The New Jersey law has a different
set of distribution priorities than the New York law. 2 2 An important
difference between the New Jersey and the New York law is that,
under New Jersey law, the defendant does not have access to any of
the proceeds taken from him under the "Son of Sam" law unless a
court orders it for his legal defense. 23 3 In contrast, under the New
York law, any money remaining in escrow after five years is returned
to the defendant.
2 3 4
New Jersey's "Son of Sam" law was challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds in Fasching v. Kallinger.235 The defendants challenging
the constitutionality of the law were Kallinger and his publisher,
Simon & Schuster. 236 The argument apparently raised by both defen-
dants was that by seizing their profits under the "Son of Sam" law
the state of New Jersey was placing a prior restraint on speech in
contravention of the First Amendment. 237 The trial court denied
Simon & Schuster's motion for summary judgment, finding the
statute to be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. 231
Simon & Schuster appealed.
228. Id. at 636.
229. Id. at 637.
230. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-26 to -33 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995).
231. Id. § 52:4B-28.
232. Id. § 52:4B-30(a)(1)-(5). First in line for distribution are victims who have
obtained civil judgments against the defendant. Id. § 52:4B-30(a)(1). Second
in priority is anyone to whom a court has ordered restitution. Id. § 52:4B-
30(a)(2). Third in priority are the judgment creditors of the defendant. Id. §
52:4B-30(a)(3). Any costs to the Victims Board will be paid fourth. Id. § 52:4B-
30(a)(4). The remainder, if any, goes to the Victims Board. Id. § 52:4B-30(a)(5).
233. Id. § 52:4B-32.
234. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(4) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1995); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1991).
235. 510 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
236. Id. at 696-97.
237. It is clear that the defendants sued on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 696.
It is also clear that Simon & Schuster claimed that their profits were being
seized. Id. at 702-04. The complete argument to the court, however, is not
explained in the opinion.
238. Id. at 699. The trial court found that even if the statute did incidentally burden
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The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
was able to avoid a constitutional analysis of its "Son of Sam"
law. 239 Like the Florida court in Rolling, the New Jersey court
disposed of the case using principles of statutory construction. 4° The
superior court held that the clear language of the statute provided
that only the criminal defendant, not the publisher, was obliged to
forfeit his profits under the New Jersey "Son of Sam" law. 24'
Kallinger was held to have no ground for appeal because an adverse
judgment had not been entered against him at the trial level. 242 The
Attorney General of New Jersey agreed with the court's interpretation
of the statute's express language.243 In addition, the legislative history
and title of the statute supported the court's interpretation. 244
The "Son of Sam" laws of Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey
have each been challenged on constitutional grounds. 24 The presiding
courts each disposed of the challenges on non-constitutional grounds,24
but only the Florida and New Jersey courts demonstrated proper
judicial restraint. These two courts carefully avoided unnecessary
interpretations of the constitutionality of their statutes. 247 The Court
of Appeals of Maryland, in contrast, engaged in a detailed consti-
tutional analysis unnecessary to its holding. 24 This holding - that
the language of Maryland's "Son of Sam" statute did not authorize
the Attorney General's suit against Ronald Price - required no
constitutional analysis.
Had the constitutionality of Maryland's "Son of Sam" law been
properly before the court of appeals, the law would have been
expression, it was valid because it met the dual requirements of the strict
scrutiny test. Id.
239. Id. at 696, 704.
240. Id. at 702-04.
241. Id. at 702-03.
242. Id. at 704. Only Simon & Schuster had moved for summary judgment below
and had been denied. See id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 703-04.
Here, the title - "An Act Concerning Certain Monies Received By
Persons Accused of Crimes" surely suggests limiting the reach of the
1983 amendments to the proceeds owed the criminal.
The legislative history as well supports a construction limiting the
statute's reach to proceeds owed one accused or convicted of a crime.
Id. at 703.
245. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 638 A.2d 93 (1994); Rolling v. Florida, 630 So.
2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
246. Price, 334 Md. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107; Rolling, 630 So. 2d at 636; Fasching,
510 A.2d at 696, 704.
247. See Rolling, 630 So. 2d at 636; Fasching, 510 A.2d at 696, 704.
248. See Price, 334 Md. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at 98-104.
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invalidated.2 49 The court of appeals would have followed the holding
of Simon & Schuster - that a law that places a financial burden on
speech is a content-based regulation that requires review under the
strict scrutiny test. 250 The court of appeals then would have held that
Maryland's "Son of Sam" law was not sufficiently tailored to
withstand the strict scrutiny test.251 The constitutionality of Mary-
land's "Son of Sam" law, however, was not properly before the
court in Curran v. Price.2 2 The court of appeals itself stated the
precedent by which it was bound: "If a decision on a constitutional
question is not necessary for a proper disposition of the case, we
will not reach it. "253 The constitutional analysis of section 764 was
improper and unnecessary because there was a non-constitutional
ground available for the proper disposition of the case, namely,
statutory interpretation.
25 4
The court of appeals adhered to the principle of "not deciding
constitutional issues unnecessarily" only in the narrowest sense -
the court did not "decide," that is, base its holding, on the consti-
tutionality of section 764.255 This narrow interpretation of the well-
established principle does not lend validity to the court's actions,
however, because it nevertheless engaged in a detailed constitutional
analysis. The court explained that section 764 was overbroad in
several areas256 and outlined the required modifications. 25 7 The effect
249. See id. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 103. "It is thus clear that this statutory scheme
imposes a heavy burden upon protected expression and it may well be argued
that the process of review provides insufficient procedural safeguards to with-
stand constitutional scrutiny." Id.
250. Id. at 162, 638 A.2d at 100. "[T]he statute's language, specifically that in
subsections (a)(5)(i) and (ii), appears to be content-based in that it requires the
Attorney General to analyze the content of the work in order to determine its
applicability to the statute. Content-based statutes ... warrant strict judicial
scrutiny." Id. at 162-63, 638 A.2d at 100; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991).
251. Price, 334 Md. at 167-70, 638 A.2d at 102-03. The court explained that some
contracts would eventually be found to be exempt from § 764 because they
would not fit the definition of notoriety of crimes contracts. Id. at 166, 638
A.2d at 102. Such contracts would not be related to the state's compelling
interests. Id. Nevertheless, the parties to the contracts would have been uncon-
stitutionally burdened during the Attorney General's review. Id.
252. Id. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 171-77, 638 A.2d at 104-07.
255. Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 107. "[W]e shall not reach the constitutionality of §
764 on its merits." Id.
256. Id. at 168-70, 638 A.2d at 101-04. If the constitutionality of the statute were
properly before the court, the statute would have been invalidated because the
court determined it to be a content-based regulation of speech that was not
narrowly tailored. Id. at 168-70, 638 A.2d at 103; see supra note 249.
257. Id. at 168-70, 638 A.2d at 103. The recommended modifications are discussed
supra notes 169-201 and accompanying text.
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of this detailed constitutional analysis is the same as it would have
been if the court had, in fact, "decided" the case on constitutional
grounds; the General Assembly can use the court's opinion to re-
write the "Son of Sam" statute so that it will withstand judicial
scrutiny the next time the statute's validity is challenged. By inter-
preting the constitutionality of section 764 unnecessarily, the court
assumed two inappropriate roles - the roles of legislator and ad-
vocate.
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland's General Assembly has decided that criminals should
not be permitted to profit from their crimes while their victims
remain uncompensated. 28 To this end, the General Assembly enacted
a "Son of Sam" law. 2 9 The law provided that a criminal's earnings
under a notoriety of crimes contract could be confiscated by the
state and made available to compensate the criminal's victims.
260
Maryland's "Son of Sam" statute provided that the Attorney General
could demand a copy of any suspected notoriety of crimes contract
in an effort to determine whether he could enforce the statute.
In 1993, Attorney General J. Joseph Curran attempted to enforce
Maryland's "Son of Sam" law for the first time. 26' When criminal
defendant Ronald Price refused to produce a copy of a suspected
notoriety of crimes contract for review, Curran sought an injunction
in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.262 The injunction was
denied in the circuit court because the judge found that the "Son of
Sam" law violated Price's First Amendment right to free speech.
263
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to hear Curran's
appeal, performed a gratuitous constitutional analysis of the "Son
of Sam" law, and outlined the required modifications. The court did
not, however, declare the statute unconstitutional. Instead, the court
based its holding on statutory interpretation. The court held that the
language of the statute authorized the Attorney General to compel
parties contracting with a defendant, not the defendant himself, to
258. Price, 334 Md. at 154-55, 638 A.2d at 96. Maryland's "Son of Sam" statute
was "enacted to prevent criminals from profiting from their own crimes through
'notoriety of crimes contracts' . . . ." Id. at 154, 638 A.2d at 96.
259. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1992 & Supp. 1995); Price, 334 Md. at 154,
638 A.2d at 96.
260. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(b)(2) (1992 & Supp. 1995); id. § 764(e)(1)(i)
(1992 & Supp. 1995).
261. See Shen, supra note 5, at BI.
262. Price, 334 Md. at 157, 638 A.2d at 97.
263. Id. "[T]he court determined that § 764 was unconstitutionally overinclusive on
its face and [that it, therefore,] violated the principles of the First Amendment."
Id.
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produce a suspected notoriety of crimes contract.2 6 The court of
appeals vacated the decision of the circuit court and remanded the
case with instructions that it be dismissed. 65
By basing its holding on statutory construction, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland claimed to have exercised judicial restraint in
deciding Curran v. Price.266 This case is troublesome, however, be-
cause the court engaged in a detailed constitutional analysis entirely
unnecessary to its holding. 267 By analyzing the constitutional issues
unnecessarily, the court ignored a long-standing principle of judicial
restraint. 2 6 The Price opinion gratuitously identified the constitu-
tional shortcomings of section 764269 in a manner likely to facilitate
amendment of the statute in the General Assembly. The court of
appeals undermined the separation of powers in Maryland by imply-
ing advocacy of a law and then advising the legislature on how to
produce the law. This judicial legislation was a step beyond both the
immediate focus of the case and the court's role as interpreter of
laws. In Curran v. Price, the Court of Appeals of Maryland vitiated
essential boundaries between the judiciary and the legislature.
Danielle B. Gibbs
264. Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 106. This would most likely be a member of the media,
e.g., book and magazine publishers or television and movie producers.
265. Id. at 177-78, 638 A.2d at 107.
266. Id. at 171, 638 A.2d at 104.
267. Id. at 166-70, 638 A.2d at 101-04.
268. The precedent was clearly stated in the opinion, but the constitutional issues
were analyzed in an earlier section of the opinion. Id. at 159-70, 638 A.2d at
98-104.
269. Id.
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